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INTRODUCTION
In March 1973, an idiosyncratic couple living in a Central Utah
farming community decided to withdraw their children from the public
schools.I John and Vickie Singer were excommunicated Mormons and
polygamists. They believed that the local elementary school occupied their
children's time unnecessarily and that the environment permitted vulgarity,
Copyright © 1996, Jay S. Bybee.
Associate Professor of Law and Harry S. Redmon, Jr. Professor (1996-97),
Louisiana State University. B.A., 1977; J.D., 1980, Brigham Young University. Stacey
Suazo ? rovided excellent research and editorial assistance.
This account is taken from Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982),
aj'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985).
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sex, and drug use. Shortly after the Singers withdrew their children, the
superintendent advised them that they could educate their children at home
if they taught them the subjects prescribed by law for the same length of
time as the public schools and if they submitted to periodic evaluation.
John Singer wrote to the Board of Education:
My God has let me know by his scriptures & by his Holy
Spirit that I am not required according to his Laws, to bow
under laws which trample upon my liberties of exercising
rights & privileges, in which liberties my God has made
me a free man. Also, knowing that my God is more
powerful than you & your illegal laws & that only slaves
will bow under those conditions; therefore, all I can say is
go to Hell you & your kind for such unrighteous
demands .
2
Thus began a six year struggle between the State of Utah and the
Singers that a federal district court would later describe as nearly a
"Tolstoyan epic."3  The Singers proved quite intransigent in their
unwillingness to allow the state to review the children's education or
evaluate their progress. The Singers claimed they were schooling the
children at home, but a psychologist from the University of Utah testified
that the children tested well below their peers and well below what would
have been expected given their parents' abilities.4 Eventually, the Singers,
who by all accounts were devoted and attentive parents, were charged with
criminal neglect and contributing to the delinquency of their children. At
one point in the hearings, John Singer protested: "I think I have a simpler
solution to the whole thing. Couldn't Your Honor just rule this law
unconstitutional which creates this compulsory action?"5 In support, Singer
plead a single case by name: Wisconsin v. Yoder.6  When it became
apparent that the school board would not compromise and that the trial
court was inclined to back the board, the Singers refused to have any
further dealings with the legal system and refused to take any appeals. By
1978, the Singer case had attracted national attention, and despite
numerous attempts by private and political figures to intervene, the matter
2 Id. at 195-96.
3 Id. at 194. The district court's decision in Vickie Singer's § 1983 action against
state officials runs 114 pages in the Federal Supplement.
4 See id. at 209, 210, 214.
5 Id. at205.6 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see Singer, 595 F. Supp. at 204-05.
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remained unresolved. Utah was determined to enforce its laws, and the
Singers were determined to resist.
In October 1978, three state agents, posing as reporters for the Los
Angeles Times, attempted to arrest John Singer. In the struggle, Singer
broke free and warded the agents off with a gun. In December, the state
began eighteen days of twenty-four hour surveillance. Finally, on January
18, 1979, ten officers on snowmobiles approached Singer while he was
using a snowblower on the entrance to his farm. When Singer saw them,
he ran, pulling a pistol from his belt. One of the officers fired a shotgun,
killing John Singer.7
On the day John Singer was killed, I was a second year law student at
Brigham Young University, less than 100 miles away. Most of us who had
followed the Singer controversy were not surprised that it had come to this
unhappy end. During the time I was in law school, no other legal issue so
agitated my classmates; and on the day Singer died a group of perhaps a
dozen students gathered in a big circle on the fourth floor of the law library
to argue over whether Singer indeed had a right to educate his children as
he pleased, whether Utah had some responsibility to the children, and
whether the U.S. Constitution s had anything at all to say about the matter.
In one of the most vilified passages of his much-criticized opinion in
Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia moved me to ask the same
question (although for a very different reason) John Singer asked. Justice
7 The story has an unhappy epilogue. Vickie Singer brought suit against Utah
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the district court dismissed in Singer v. Wadman.
In 1988, Vickie Singer, her son-in-law Addam Swapp, and other family members were
convicted of bombing a Mormon chapel. Swapp also was convicted in the death of a
policeman in the 13-day siege following the bombing. See "Polygamous Clan Leader
Sentenced to 15 Years," REUTERS (Sept. 2, 1988) (LEXIS/NEXIS File); "Polygamists'
Murder Trial Is Ending," NEW YoRK TIMES, Dec. 19, 1988, at B8.8 The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides in part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
" 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Scalia stated flatly that the Court had "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the
record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts
that proposition. ,"10 To those of us who, whether sympathetic or critical of
the result in Smith, asked quizzically, "What about Wisconsin v. Yoder?"
the Court had an answer:
The only decisions in which [it had] held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as... the right of parents.., to direct
the education of their children.1
What are we to make of Wisconsin v. Yoder? Shall we pity the Old
World Amish? First, no one in New Glarus, Wisconsin seemed to want
them in town, and now no one seems to want their Supreme Court case
either. If the Court is to be taken at its word, Yoder survives Smith. But
what is it that survives? The judgment itself was, of course, not in danger.
On the other hand, Yoder as a pure Free Exercise case would seem to be
dead. But as something else-the Court called it a "hybrid"-it seems very
much alive. Smith seems to affirm in Yoder a parental right to direct
education. Was the parental right necessary to the Court's decision in
Yoder, or was it simply convenient to the Court in Smith to avoid having to
confront its popular decision in Yoder?'
2
In this paper I intend to examine the nature of parents' due process
right to direct the education of their children and its relationship to the First
Amendment. I begin with the hardiest of the Court's early substantive due
process decisions: Meyer v. Nebraska" and Pierce v. Society of Sisters."
Meyer struck down a Nebraska law forbidding the teaching of foreign
language in public or private schools; Pierce struck down an Oregon law
10 Id. at 878-79.
" Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Yoder and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).
12 See Stephen L. Carter, Does the First Amendment Protect More Than Free
Speech?, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 871, 882 (1992) ("No group other than the Amish has
been given so broad an exemption from generally applicable laws, and were the Yoder case to
arise today, it is not at all clear that the outcome would be the same.*).
13 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
[25:887
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requiring attendance at public schools. As I recount in Part I, the laws in
both cases were the result of complex forces, uniting groups as disparate as
the Ku Klux Klan and the progressives, both of which advocated the
"Americanization" of the state's young people. In both cases, the incidence
of the laws fell heavily and deliberately on parochial schools. Yet in both
cases the Supreme Court ignored the claims of infringement of religious
liberty and resorted to the reasoning of substantive due process to recognize
a parental right to direct children's education.
As I discuss in Part 1, the constitutional bases for parental rights and
free exercise claims in the 1920s were more closely connected than we
might have thought at first glance. Indeed, for the Court in that era, free
exercise rights were substantive due process rights. Deciding Meyer and
Pierce on the basis of parental rights, rather than free exercise grounds,
imposed few additional intellectual costs on the Court and, importantly,
absolved the Court of some difficult questions surrounding the relationship
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Like the Court's earlier
substantive due process cases, Meyer and Pierce are without constitutional
rigor, thereby giving the Court great flexibility to support benevolent
causes.
In Part m, I discuss Wisconsin v. Yoder, and in Part IV, I show that
Yoder follows in the substantive due process tradition of Meyer and Pierce.
Unlike those cases, Yoder comes with the formal trappings of the Free
Exercise Clause, but like those cases, Yoder's free exercise rights are fitted
into a larger patchwork of substantive due process rights. As a result,
Yoder too lacks doctrinal rigor and becomes a useful vehicle for giving the
Court a way out in difficult cases, while not imposing any additional form
on the First Amendment. In this sense, Yoder survives Smith, but only
because there is so little to survive.
I. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LBERTY IN MEYER AND PIERCE
A. English-Only and Compulsory Public Education in Context
The Supreme Court's decisions in Meyer and Pierce have become such
a staple of modem substantive due process that many have overlooked the
complex forces that brought those cases to the Supreme Court in the first
place and then resulted in near unanimous decisions. Meyer v. Nebraska
and its companion case, Bartels v. Iowa,15 struck down laws in Nebraska,
Iowa, and Ohio that forbade the teaching of any foreign language in any
15 262 U.S. 404 (1923). Bartels comprised four cases, one each from Iowa and
Nebraska and two from Ohio.
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school until the pupils had reached the eighth grade. In Pierce the Court
struck down an Oregon law requiring children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to attend public schools. Given the Nebraska law's proximity
to World War I and the fact that the defendant was accused of teaching
German, I always assumed that the law at issue in Meyer simply reflected
post-war anti-German sentiment. Compounding my error, I also assumed
that Oregon's compulsory public school attendance law in Pierce was
attributable to anti-Catholic sentiment. While my assumptions were not
incorrect, they were far from complete and proved an unsatisfactory
explanation for the states' laws, the lower courts' decisions, and the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions.
16
In actuality, many other forces combined to create a desire in the states
to "Americanize" their children. Beginning in the late Nineteenth Century,
populists and progressives demanded fundamental political and social
reforms. They resisted industrialization, advocated corporate reforms,
insisted on greater equality between the sexes, and demanded greater
political control by the people. They favored the labor movement and
decried factory working conditions and the use of child labor. 17 It was a
period of great legislative activity, as these reforms found their way into
positive law. In the seven-year period from 1913 to 1920, four
constitutional amendments were ratified, granting power to Congress to tax
incomes, 18 providing for direct election of senators, 19 prohibiting the sale
or transportation of intoxicating liquor,20 and granting women the right to
vote. 2 1 The Seventeenth Amendment is representative of the era. The
amendment, which took the power to elect senators from state legislatures
and placed it in the electors themselves, originated in the perception that
corporations had corrupted state legislatures and the conviction that "[ijf the
people of a State have enough intelligence to choose their representatives in
the State Legislature ... they have enough intelligence to choose the men
16 Extensive background on Meyer and Pierce can be found in WILLIAM G. ROSS,
FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONsITUTION, 1917-1927
(1994) [hereinafter Ross, FORGING FREEDOMS]; William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer
v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 125 (1988) [hereinafter Ross,
Judicial Janus]; and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and
Pierce and The Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992).
17 See Ross, FORGING FREEDOMS, supra note 16, at 26-29; Woodhouse, supra note
16, at 1016-29.
IS U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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who shall represent them in the United States Senate." 22  The populists
regarded the voters as "a new people living and acting under an old
system..23
Political reform was, of course, only part of a much greater
reformation. Educational reform represented an important, parallel front.
Education was important to populist goals as a means of socializing and
Americanizing the people. For "new people" involved in governing
themselves, education would level differences of class, race, and
alienage. 24 The means for providing for such an education would require,
if not a common schooling, at least a common language. During this
period, prominent educators, the National Education Association, and an
advisory committee to the Secretary of the Interior strongly recommended
that basic classes be taught in English only.25
The advent of World War I only exacerbated the demand for common
schooling. The United States, given the choice between the British and
Germans, had entered the war on the side of the English-speaking world.
We emerged from the war as a world power, determined to conquer the
world within our borders as well as without. The populists' notions of
leveling American society through common schooling found a sympathetic
ear in nativists, those who demanded "100-percent American" and opposed
26further immigration to the United States. Common schooling, in English,
would ensure a more homogenous population in the future. Stories of
American soldiers unable to understand orders given in English27 added to
the fervor with which Americans of many stripes were willing to rally
behind the Masonic cry for "One Flag, One School, One Language. 28 As
22 26 CONG. REC. 7775 (1894) (statement of Rep. William Jennings Bryan); see C.H.
HoEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the
Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500 (1997) [hereinafter
Bybee, The Seventeenth Amendment].
23 28 CONG. REc. 1383 (1896) (statement of Sen. David Turpie). Both Nebraska and
Oregon found themselves at the front of this political reform movement that demanded
greater power in the electorate. See HoEBEKE, supra note 22, at 146; Bybee, The
Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 22, at 544.
24 Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1017.
26 Seeid.at101-11.
26 See Jack W. Rodgers, The Foreign Language Issue in Nebraska, 1918-1923, 39
NEB. HIsT. 1 (1958).27 See Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical l.uitheran Synod v. McKelvie, 175 N.W. 531,
533 (1919).
28 Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1018 & n.95; see WILLIAM BENTLEY BALL, "MERE
CREATURES OF THE STATE": A VIEW FROM THE COURTROOM 11-12 (1994).
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Professor Woodhouse, in her study of Oregon's compulsory public school
act, concluded, "[t]he guiding sentiment ... seems to have been an odd
commingling of patriotic fervor, blind faith in the cure-all powers of
common schooling, anti-Catholic and anti-foreign prejudice, and the
conviction that private and parochial schools were breeding grounds of
Bolshevism." 29 She pointed out that such laws would level social classes
and obviate the need for child labor laws.
30
The incidence of the common language proposals fell squarely on the
German-speaking population. By the start of the Twentieth Century,
German-speaking Americans were the single largest ethnic group other
than the super-numerous British-Americans. The German-Americans were
distinct by language and culture and resisted assimilation in part because
they considered "'their "culture" . . . superior to the one they found in the
New World."' 31  Determined to maintain a distinct culture, German-
Americans congregated largely in the Midwest. They established their own
schools, typically under the auspices of the Lutheran and Catholic
Churches. These schools taught some subjects in German, essential for
young Lutherans, whose services were frequently held in High German.
32
For German-Americans, English-only education would weaken their
children's ties to their culture, and the next step, compulsory public
education, would threaten assimilation into an inferior culture.
Catholics had additional cause for concern over proposals for
compulsory public education. The public schools had long been the
domain of Protestant Americans. 33 Bible readings and prayers in school
reflected Protestant beliefs. 34 Both Protestants and Catholics regarded each
other with the suspicion that their respective school systems were tools for
propaganda and evangelization. The "Protestant" public school system,
29 Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1017-18; see David B. Tyack, The Perils of
Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HisT. REv. 74 (1968). Tyack
devotes his attention to the Ku Klux Klan's involvement in the Oregon controversy. See also
M. Paul Holsinger, The Oregon School Bill Controversy, 1922-1925, 37 PAc. HIST. REv.
327 (1968).
31 See Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1018, 1029.
31 Ross, Judicial Janus, supra note 16, at 131 (quoting RICHARD KRICKUS, PURSUING
THE AMERICAN DREAM: WHrrE EThNics AND ThE NEw POPULISM 142 (1976)).
32 See Ross, Judicial Janus, supra note 16, at 132 n.37.
33 Although Lutherans are classified as "Protestants" in today's nomenclature, the
early Lutherans regarded Protestants as "generic," lacking theological rigor, and thus similar
to the churches they left in Germany. See Ross, FORGING FREEDOMS, supra note 16, at 17.
34 See LEo PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 281-90, 374-82 (1953); Ross,
FORGING FREEDOMS, supra note 16, at 20, 23; Tyack, supra note 30, at 80.
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however, had the advantage of tax support. Catholics had previously
sought federal funding for their schools and would again seek public
funding.
36
B. Meyer and English-Only Laws
1. The English-only rules in Nebraska
In 1919, the Nebraska legislature enacted the Siman Law, which made
it a misdemeanor for any person "individually, or as a teacher," to teach
"in any private, denominational, parochial or public school... any subject
to any person in any language than the English language."07  The
Evangelical Lutheran Synod, two other churches, and parents quickly
brought suit in Nebraska state court for injunctive relief. The churches,
which all operated parochial schools in which classes were conducted in
other languages, including German, Polish, and Bohemian, argued that
"the teaching of foreign languages is largely to enable [parents] to
participate in the same religious services and exercises in the home and in
the church."38 The churches acknowledged that Nebraska had the power to
require study of certain subjects in private schools, but they denied that
Nebraska could prevent students from studying additional courses beyond
those prescribed by the state.
The lower court denied relief, and the Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed in Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie
(McKelvie 1). The Nebraska Supreme Court described the purpose of the
Siman Law as
35 See Ross, FORGING FREEDOMS, supra note 16, at 23. The Blaine Amendment,
proposed in 1876, was a response to Catholic requests for public funds. The Blaine
amendment provided, in part: "[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools. . . shall ever be under the control of any religious sect or denomination." 4
CONG. REC. 5190 (1876) (House version). The amendment passed the House, id. at 5191-
92, but died in the Senate. Id. at 5595. See also LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE
NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 138-40 (1987); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the
First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1596 (1995) [hereinafter Bybee, Taking Liberties]; Alfred W. Meyer,
The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REv. 939 (1951).
36 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Illinois a rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).37 1919 Neb. Laws, ch. 249 (quoted in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397
(1923)).38 Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 175 N.W. 531, 533
(1919).
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the upbuilding of an intelligent American citizenship,
familiar with the principles and ideals upon which this
government was founded, to imbue the alien child with the
tradition of our past, to give him the knowledge of the
lives of Washington, Franklin, Adams, Lincoln, and other
men who lived in accordance with such ideals, and to teach
him love for his country, and hatred of dictatorship,
whether by autocrats, by the proletariat, or by any man, or
class of men.
39
It then found that "nothing in the act. . . prevent[s] parents, teachers, or
pastors from conveying religious or moral instruction in the language of the
parents... or in teaching any other branch of learning or accomplishment,
provided that such instruction is given at such time that it will not interfere
with the required studies."4° While the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected
the churches' claim that the law interfered with the families' religious
practices, it referred to no particular provision of the Nebraska Constitution
or the Fourteenth Amendment.
In response to the court's decision in McKelvie I, some churches
changed the hours of the afternoon session of school from 1 to 4 o'clock to
1:30 to 4 o'clock. This had the effect of freeing the half hour from 1 to
1:30 from formal school control. Robert Meyer, a teacher at a parochial
school sponsored by the Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, was
charged with violation of the Siman Law. Meyer had taught a ten-year old
boy between 1 and 1:30 p.m. out of a German book of Bible stories.4 1
Meyer claimed that, technically, he was not teaching the boy during school
hours. Because students continued to assemble in school during this half
hour period just as they had before, the lower court permitted the jury to
decide if the half-hour period was pretextual, which the jury so concluded.
Meyer was convicted and fined $25.
The question for the Nebraska Supreme Court was, "[djoes the [Siman
Law] interfere with the right of religious freedom, by prohibiting the
teaching of a foreign language, when that language is taught with the idea
39 Id. at 534.
40 Id.
41 See Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 101 (1922); Brief and Argument for Plaintiff
in Error, at 2-3, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325), reprinted in 21
LANDMARK BRIES AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ThE UNITED STATES (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds. 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS].
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and purpose of later using it... in religious worship?" 42 The court found
that the law did not so interfere. Teaching the German language surely
would have "ma[d]e more convenient the matter of religious worship with
[the students'] parents, whose knowledge of English was limited," but
"[tihe law in no way attempts to restrict religious teachings, nor to mold
beliefs, nor interfere with the entire freedom of religious worship." 43 The
law, the Court concluded, "does not unlawfully interfere with the right of
religious freedom in the school, or the incidental right to freely give
religious instruction, as guaranteed by the Constitution. As in McKelvie
I, the Court did not identify whose "Constitution" or which provisions of
that Constitution might have been at issue.
Justice Letton, who authored McKelvie I, dissented. According to
Letton, by approving the lower court's findings that the half hour period
was pretextual, the court rewrote the holding of McKelvie I and read the
Siman Law to forbid any instruction in a foreign language, whether or not
the matter taught was a core subject or was supplemental to a core subject
taught in English. He believed that the court had extended the law to
prohibit the teaching of a foreign language outside of the core classes, a
holding that might "'destroy both the God-given and constitutional right of
a parent to have some voice in the bringing up and education of his
children. 
g 
45
In 1921, while Meyer's case was working its way through the
Nebraska courts, the Nebraska legislature enacted a new law, the Norval
Law. More restrictive than the Siman Law, the Norval Law prohibited any
person "individually or as a teacher" from "teach[ing] any subject to any
person in any language other than the English language. "46  The
Evangelical Lutheran Synod again brought suit for injunctive relief, and in
Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie (McKelvie
1/)47 the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the law on the basis of McKelvie
I and Meyer. The court frankly admitted that the purpose of the law was to
42 Meyer, 187 N.W. at 102. From the pleadings, the Nebraska Supreme Court
declared that it was evident that Meyer was not conducting "devotional exercises in the
German language," noting that if that had been claimed, "it would have presented an entirely
different question." Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 103.
41 Id. at 104 (Letton, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039,
1043 1914)).
NEB. LAws, ch. 61 (1921) (quoted in Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 n.3
(1923)).
47 187 N.W. 927 (1922).
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"curtail. . . the rearing of children of foreign parentage in the language of
their parents." 48  The court denied that the law violated due process or
equal protection; neither did it "interfere with religious liberty nor with the
giving of religious instruction." 49
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions in Meyer, McKelvie I, and
McKelvie II are interesting because the court never really took the religious
liberty argument seriously. It did not take the argument seriously enough
to quote the Nebraska Bill of Rights-which seemed quite on pointS°-nor
did it think the Fourteenth Amendment substantial enough to warrant
reference to any particular clause or language. As I explain in greater
detail below, because the doctrine of incorporation was only emerging, it is
at least understandable why the court did not give greater heed to the
Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, Justice Letton's brief dissent
in Meyer was quite significant because it suggested that the Siman Law not
only imposed an affirmative duty on schools to teach core subjects in
English, but also forbade the teaching of any subject matter in a language
other than English. The latter point put the Siman Law on a very different
footing. Requiring the teaching of core subjects in English was a small step
from the power-which all seemed to concede-of the state to prescribe a
curriculum. But to forbid the teaching of a particular subject matter was a
more serious exercise of the state's police power. As Justice Letton
pointed out, the state could no more forbid parents to have their children
taught French, Spanish, or Italian than it could forbid the teaching of music
4s Id. at 928.
9 Id. at 929. Chief Justice Morrissey dissented on the grounds that the law was an
unreasonable exercise of the state's police power.
so NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides:
All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No
person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
worship against his consent, and no preference shall be given by law to
any religious society, nor shall any interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required as a
qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a
witness on account of his religious beliefs; but nothing herein shall be
construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Religion, morality,
and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be
the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws to protect every religious
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public
worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.
(emphasis added).
[25:887
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or art.51  While Meyer stood accused of teaching the Bible in German,
Justice Letton made the case into one of parental rights.
Nebraska was not the only state with such an English-only restriction.
Some 31 other states had enacted similar provisions. 52 Ohio in State v.
Poh53 and Iowa in State v. Bartels54 sustained their laws. There was one
notable difference between Ohio's law and Nebraska's. The Ohio Code
not only required that subjects be taught in English only, it specifically
forbid the teaching of "the Gennan language ... below the eighth grade in
any [private and parochial schools] of this state."55  In Pohl, the Ohio
Supreme Court made quick work of Pohl's conviction for teaching German
in a parochial school. "Courts do not sit to review the wisdom of
legislative acts ...;" Pohl's arguments "might better be addressed to the
legislative branch. 
56
If the Nebraska Supreme Court lacked focus in Meyer, and the Ohio
Supreme Court lacked substance in Pohl, the Iowa Supreme Court's
decision in Bartels lacked neither. Parochial school teacher August Bartels
was convicted of teaching reading in German. The Iowa law did not suffer
from the same ambiguities as the Nebraska law. It plainly forbid only the
teaching of "secular subjects" in a foreign language before the eighth
grade. 5 The Iowa Supreme Court, quoting both the Inalienable Rights
Clause and the Religion Clauses of the Iowa Constitution,58 declared that
the statute "in no manner whatsoever interferes with [Bartels'] right to
impart religious instruction in any language he may choose in a parochial
school." It continued, "he can teach his pupils to read the catechism in
German in his school, if he desires, as religious instruction, without
violating the law. 09 The prohibition only applied to the teaching of secular
subjects. While three justices dissented, believing that "[a]bility to speak
51 Meyer, 187 N.W. at 104 (Letton, J., dissenting).
52 Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1004.
53 132 N.E. 20 (1921), rev'd sub nom. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
5 181 N.W. 508 (1921), rev'd, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
55 OHIO GEN CODE. § 7762-2 (repealed 1927) (emphasis added) (quoted in Bartels v.
Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 410 n.2 (1923)).
56 Pohl, 132 N.E. at 21.
57 Bartels, 181 N.W. at511.
" Id. at 513-14. Article I, § 3 of the Iowa Constitution was similar to our First
Amendment: "The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any person be compelled to attend
any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates, for building or repairing places or
worship, or the maintenance of any minister or ministry."
Bartels, 181 N.W. at 514.
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and to read a language is essential to intelligent worship," 6° the Bartels
decision was a far more narrow holding of a less ambitious law.
The Supreme Court granted review in all three criminal cases (Meyer,
Pohl, and Bartels) and in McKelvie II. There was no obvious reason that
the Court should have preferred one case over the others. All three of the
plaintiffs in error in the criminal cases were teachers convicted of
instructing in German in Lutheran parochial schools. All were accused of
teaching reading, although only in the case of Robert Meyer was a
religious text involved. The Ohio law differed from the Nebraska and
Iowa laws in that it singled out German; this might have made the Pohl
decision the easiest of the cases to decide and offered the Court the
narrowest grounds for decision. It would not, however, have resolved the
other two cases. Meyer appeared to embrace the broadest prohibition,
extending to all subjects taught at any time in a school setting. A decision
against the state in Meyer would likely decide McKelvie II and Pohl, but it
would not necessarily decide Bartels, which offered the most reasonable
approach.
2. Meyer before the Supreme Court
The briefs in the four cases are most remarkable for their lack of focus.
They are an amalgam of broad platitudes that counsel made little attempt to
locate within the U.S. Constitution. At one point in oral argument, Chief
Justice Taft pressed "to be able to put our finger on the particular provision
of the Constitution that is violated. The arguments of counsel have been
summarized elsewhere. I wish to review briefly here those arguments
bearing on religious liberty.
Despite the nature of the arguments pressed before the Nebraska
courts, and the door opened by Justice Letton's dissent, Robert Meyer's
counsel pressed a single basic argument: that Meyer's right to pursue his
profession as a teacher was infringed by the Siman Law, in violation of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 Counsel for the Evangelical
Lutheran Synod in McKelvie II was more aggressive, claiming that "the
60 Id. at 516 (Evans, J., dissenting).
61 Transcript of Oral Argument, at 13, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and
Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), reprinted
in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 774.
62 E.g., Ross, Judicial Janus, supra note 16.63 See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error, at 7-22, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325), reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note
41, at 681-96.
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right of religious liberty is one of the immunities and privileges that is
protected by Section 1 of the 14th Amendment. "64 But counsel could cite
no cases in support of the proposition and offered no analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment beyond reference to each of the clauses in Section
1. Counsel pressed more vigorously, however, the claim that the Nebraska
Enabling Act of 1864 required "by an article forever irrevocable ... [t]hat
perfect tolerance of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant
of said state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his
or her mode of religious worship."
65
Nebraska mounted a more spirited defense of the point than the church
had invited. It answered the claim of the Nebraska Enabling Act by
quoting Article I, Section 4 of the Nebraska Constitution and arguing that
no portion of the law in question interfered with religious exercise.66 The
state then launched a denunciation of the argument: "The point is that the
plaintiffs in their endeavor to foist the German language upon immature
children have attempted to do so under the pretext of religious teaching.' 67
The plaintiffs would "advance[e] the great work of Americanization" if
they would "educate their parishioners . . . What is needed is more
English in the church rather than more German in the schools." 68
In its reply, the Evangelical Lutheran Synod cited, for the first time,
the religion clause of the Nebraska Bill of Rights. Even at this point, the
Synod did not argue directly that the Nebraska law violated the Nebraska
Bill of Rights. Rather, it simply pointed out that the last sentence-
"Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good
64 Brief for Plaintiff in Error, at 38, Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v.
McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (No. 404).
65 Id. at 37 (quoting Act of Apr. 19, 1864, § 4, 13 Stat. 48 (1864)). Neither Bartels
nor Pohl offered a serious argument based on religious liberty. In response, Ohio noted that
"No religious liberties are interfered with. . . ; [ijf a parent wishes his child taught Martin
Luther's dogma in Martin Luther's language, there is no law against the child being taught
that language, unless it takes so much of the child's time and health as to endanger society in
that regard..." Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error, State of Ohio, at 6, Pohl v. Ohio,
262 U.S. 404 (1923) (Nos. 181, 182). Iowa also noted that Bartels was not deprived of his
right to worship as he pleased, and that he "has so little confidence in this assertion ... that
he does not argue the point at length, and we will therefore refrain from further comment
thereon." Brief and Argument of the State of Iowa, at 8, Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404
(1923) (No. 134).
6 Brief and Argument of Defendants in Error, at 41-42, Nebraska Dist. of
Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (No. 404). The section of
the Nebraska Bill of Rights quoted by the state is quoted supra at note 50.
67 Brief and Argument of Defendants in Error, at 44, McKelvie.
6 Id. at 44, 45.
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government, it shall be the duty of the legislature to pass suitable laws to
protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own
mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of
instruction"-was taken from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and, in
context, referred to private schools.
69
At oral argument, counsel for the Evangelical Lutheran Synod again
proved more aggressive on the question of religious liberty. In response to
a question from the Chief Justice as to whether "the free exercise of
religion" was "incorporate[d]" in the Due Process Clause, counsel
answered that it was guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
70
Counsel indicated that he would include within the Fourteenth Amendment
"free speech[,] . . .the right to study, and the right to use the human
intellect as a man sees fit[, and the right] of controlling ... [one's] own
family." 71 Counsel did not mention the First Amendment.
72
3. Meyer v. Nebraska
Against this array of doctrinal choices and expository vehicles, the
Court decided Meyer v. Nebraska first,73 holding the Siman Law
69 Reply Brief in Behalf of Plaintiffs in Error, at 29, McKelvie.
70 Transcript of Oral Argument, at 15, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and
Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), reprinted
in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 776. Earlier, counsel
mentioned both the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clauses as
guaranteeing "the freedom of religion and the freedom of conscience." For discussion of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as the means for incorporating the Bill of Rights, see
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). I have discussed the
approach both as a textual and as a historical matter in Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra note
35, at 1605-12.
7' Transcript of Oral Argument, at 15, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and
Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404 (1923),
reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 776.
7 In hindsight, it is not surprising that counsel for the Evangelical Lutheran Synod in
McKelvie H pressed their religious liberty claims and counsel for Meyer, Pohl and Bartels did
not. In the first place, counsel in the three criminal cases represented teachers, not parents or
students, and their religious liberty claims were less apparent. That, of course, was not a
sufficient excuse, since the question of religious liberty had been squarely raised below. The
better explanation is that in 1923, it was questionable whether the U.S. Constitution imposed
any religion-based restrictions on the states. Moreover, even if the First Amendment-or
something like the First Amendment-applied to the states, it was not clear that the Free
Exercise Clause had anything to contribute to the plaintiffs' cause. See infra text
acconanying notes 123-50.
The fact that the Court decided Meyer alone is somewhat unusual since the Court
heard arguments in both Meyer and McKelvie H together in February 1923. Bartels had been
(continued)
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unconstitutional. In the process, the Court plowed new ground. It refused
to decide the case exclusively on the basis of Meyer's employment rights,
and it failed to address the religious rights of parents, students or teachers;
rather, it patched together a number of things.74 The Court, in an opinion
by Justice McReynolds,75 began with the observation that it had not
define[d] with exactness the liberty... guaranteed [in the
Fourteenth Amendment] . . . .Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
76pursuit of happiness by free men.
This definition was extraordinarily broad, covering employment,
education, marriage and family, religion, and anything else "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness .... "7 If the Court was serious, there were
virtually no domestic affairs left to the exclusive control of the states.
From this broad assertion, the Court observed that "[t]he American
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as
matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted."
78
The Court's sole evidence for this proposition was the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which stated: "Religion, morality and knowledge
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." 79  As the
argued in October 1922; Pohl, in November.
Ross, Judicial Janus, supra 16, at 203-04 ("Meyer is a Janus-faced decision which
uses concepts borrowed from the old doctrine of economic due process to create a new theory
of personal freedom.").
75 Justice McReynolds must have found himself in personal conflict over the result in
Meyer. He was a great supporter of substantive due process rights, particularly the right of
contract. On the other hand, he had made intemperate remarks concerning German-
Americans in an earlier dissent in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), in which he
had referred to "malevolents from Germany, a country then engaged in hunnish warfare and
notoriously encouraged by many of its natives who, unhappily, had obtained citizenship
here." Id. at 42 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). See Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1083-84.
76 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
7 Id.
78 Id. at 400.
79 Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio,
(continued)
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Evangelical Lutheran Synod had pointed out, this provision was identical to
the concluding line in the religion clause of the Nebraska Bill of Rights.
Yet the Court made no reference whatsoever to the Nebraska Constitution.
The Court's reference to the Northwest Ordinance was more than ironic.
That same phrase in the Northwest Ordinance had been the basis for the
argument in Permoli v. First Municipality, that "It]he United States have
guarantied, to their inhabitants, religious liberty."8  The Court in Permoli
had rejected the argument. Once states were admitted to the union, it said,
the Northwest Ordinance was irrelevant; religious liberty was secured, if at
all, by state constitutions.
81
Despite its broad reference to "liberty" and its observation on the place
of education, the Court did not have a constitutional premise that would
explain why Nebraska could not make judgments regarding the best way to
educate its children. The Court found its premise in natural law. It was
"the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to
their station in life," an obligation which could be enforced through
compulsory education laws. 82 In other words, compulsory education laws
were simply a means of enforcing the natural obligations of parents.
"Practically," however, parents could no longer educate their children
themselves; education was only made possible through "especially qualified
persons," 83 such as Robert Meyer. Because Meyer taught German "as part
of his occupation[,] [h]is right thus to teach and the right of parents to
engage him so to instruct their children ... [were] within the liberty of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment. "84 On the great scale of rights, this right could
not be subordinated to the desire "to foster a homogeneous people with
American ideals."" In sum, "the Legislature ha[d] attempted materially to
interfere with the calling of modem language teachers, with the
opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents
Art m, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
80 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 595 (1845) (argument of counsel).
"l Id. at 610.
82 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
83 Id.
84 Id. The progression in the Court's argument from (1) the duty of parents to
educate their children, (2) their inability to assume full responsibility for that education, and
(3) the need to hire a teacher, facilitated the Court's use of the education argument because
Meyer, as a teacher, did not have standing to raise the interests of the parents. See DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTrrUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at
153 & n. 104 (1990). This difficulty would have been more easily overcome if the Court had
used McKelvie II (in which parents had intervened) as its principal vehicle instead of Meyer.
85 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
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to control the education of their own. "86 The Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. The same day, the Court issued a separate opinion in
Bartels, Pohl, and McKelvie II (collectively "Bartels"). In a brief, non-
substantive opinion, the Court reversed all three on the authority of
Meyer.
8 7
Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Sutherland, dissented in all four
cases. Justice Holmes began with the proposition that "it is desirable that
all the citizens of the United States should speak a common tongue....,88
For Holmes, the only question was whether the means devised by the states
for accomplishing this purpose deprived teachers of liberty.8 9 Because the
question of English-only schooling was one on which reasonable people
might differ, the Constitution did not "preventi] the experiment being
tried. ,90
C. Pierce and Compulsory Public Education
While Midwestern states were struggling with their English-only laws,
Oregon adopted by referendum a mandatory public school bill that went far
beyond the English-only laws at issue in Meyer and Bartels. The
compulsory school bill was "the most upsetting factor in the history of
Oregon since the agitation over slavery. "91 Oregon's law, adopted in
1922, provided that "[a]ny parent.., who shall fail or neglect or refuse to
send such child to a public school... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. "92
The Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary and the Hill
Military Academy brought suit in federal court before a three-judge district
court for injunctive relief.93  The schools alleged that the Oregon
Compulsory Education Act violated the Privileges or Immunities and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contracts Clause.9a
The district court held that the Act violated the schools' due process
8 Id. at 401.
87 See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923).
88 Id. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Holsinger, supra note 29, at 341 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 1922, at 12).
92 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 n.* (1925) (quoting ORE.
LAws § 5259).
93 Society of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928 (D. Ore. 1924), afd, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
94 Id.
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rights. 95 The court first found that the schools could represent their own
rights and the rights of parents whose children would be affected by the
law. 96 Following the reasoning of Meyer and citing Lochner, the district
court found that the right to "contract in relation to one's business is a
liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 9 7
[Plarochial and private schools have existed almost from
time immemorial-so long, at least, that their privilege and
right to teach the grammar grades must be regarded as
natural and inherent. . . . The absolute right of these
schools to teach in the grammar grades . . . and the right
of the parents to engage them to instruct their children...
is within the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
98
The state's "melting pot idea" was "an extravagance in simile," as "the
assimilation problem [of children foreign-born and of foreign-born
parentage] could afford no reasonable basis for the adoption of the
measure. '99  The court struck down the law without referring at all to
questions of religious liberty.
1. Pierce before the Supreme Court
In Pierce, for the first time, the state found itself before the Supreme
Court as the plaintiff in error. Somewhat surprisingly, even though the
court below made no reference to religion, when counsel for the state
approached the Court, they argued vigorously that there was no issue of
religious liberty in Pierce. Counsel for Governor Walter Pierce, for
example, argued that the First Amendment did not bind the states at all; the
statement in Meyer referring to "the right of the individual... to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience" 1°°-was "dicta . . .
directly decided to the contrary" by the Court in Permoli.10 1 Counsel for
Oregon's Attorney General offered a more spirited defense. Not only had
Permoli held that the states were not obligated by virtue of the federal
95 The court found that, as corporations, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the
protection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 931 (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 45 (1900)).
96 Id. at 932-33.
97 Id. at 936.
9' Id. at 937.
9 Id. at 938.
:oo Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
01 Brief for Appellant, the Governor of the State of Oregon, at 43, reprinted in 23
LANDMARK BRiEFs AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 50.
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Constitution to respect religious liberty, even if the matter were to be
decided under the First Amendment, Reynolds v. United States'°2 stood as
an insuperable obstacle to the argument for religious liberty: "The books
are full of cases in which the contention has been advanced that the
religious convictions of a party have required him to break the law,
and... [tjhe courts have everywhere refused to uphold this contention."'1 3
The Attorney General's brief then suggested that, if the Court recognized a
right of private instruction, it might sound the end for public education. 1
04
As in Meyer, the argument of counsel for the schools lacked doctrinal
rigor and gave little attention to the question of religious liberty, a
somewhat surprising result given the state's protests that religion was not
involved. 105 The Society of Sisters did respond that "if the state can abolish
worthy private schools" the "separation of church and state means that
there shall be no church but only the state."1 6  At oral argument, the
Society's lead counsel, William Guthrie, told the Justices that the question
of religious liberty was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court
in the Attorney General's brief,10 7 a rather strange posture for someone
whose client could only benefit from the argument based on religious
liberty. Guthrie argued that the state's position was "because religious
instruction cannot be given in the public schools under the Constitution and
laws of Oregon, the state may forbid its being given anywhere else!" Then
Guthrie upped the rhetoric of his argument:
102 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
103 Brief for Appellant, Isaac H. Van Winkle, at 35, reprinted in 23 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 115-16; see also id. at 34-47, 71-78, reprinted in
23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 115-28, 152-59.
104 Id. at 72-73, reprinted in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41,
at 153-54.
105 Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the schools, however, by groups representing
the American Jewish Committee, the Seventh-Day Adventists, and the Episcopal Church.
106 Brief on Behalf of Appellee (Kavanaugh Brief), at 58, reprinted in 23 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 320. See also id. at 56-68, reprinted in 23
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 318-30. The Society of Sisters was
represented by two counsel, William Guthrie and J.P. Kavanaugh, who each filed a brief and
appeared before the Court at oral argument. Guthrie was a partner in a predecessor to what
is now Cravath, Swaine & Moore. He was professor of law at Columbia University and was
once mentioned as a candidate for the Supreme Court along with two other names: Benjamin
Cardozo and Harlan F. Stone. Thomas J. Shelley, The Oregon School Case and The
National Catholic Weyfare Conference, 75 CATH. HIsT. REv. 439, 445'n.14 (1989).
'o Transcript of Oral Argument (March 17, 1925), at 12, 14 (argument of William
Guthrie), reprinted in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at 485, 487.
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Could there be a plainer confession of the truth than
we find in the Attorney General's candid brief, that the
underlying motive and the immediate intent and purpose of
this measure were anti-religious and to prevent religious
instruction to children-as much so as any atheistic or
sovietic measure ever adopted in Russia?1
08
Guthrie's flourish was a bit of hyperbole since Oregon did not deny parents
the right to provide outside educational or religious instruction. Counsel
for the Governor, however, could not have allayed Guthrie's fears or aided
his own case with his poorly crafted, anti-Catholic response. Departing
from the safe themes of Permoli and Reynolds, counsel told the Court:
The power and right of the state to control the
education of children is challenged by counsel; and he
insists most persistently that the state has no such power,
but that the parents have the sole right of control, and that
it is their constitutional right and a liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to educate their children as
they will.
[That position is in direct opposition to the Canon law
of the Catholic Church. It is provided by the law of that
church, Canon 1374, that "Catholic children must not
attend non-Catholic, neutral or mixed schools; that is, such
as are open to non-Catholics. It is for the Bishop of the
place alone to decide, according to the instruction of the
Apostolic See, under what circumstances or with what
precautions attendance at such schools may be tolerated
without danger of perversion of the pupils."
mhe Canons of the Church under whose jurisdiction
the appellee operates take away from the parents the
control of the education of the child, and absolutely dictate
what school the child shall attend. So that, as between the
church itself and the state, we insist that the state has the
prior and paramount right to direct the education of the
children in the state.
108 Id. at 14, reprinted in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at
[25:887
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In the one case, a violation of the Oregon statute is
punishable as a misdemeanor. In the other, I do not know
what punishment may be meeted out to those who violate
the laws of the church....
I question the right of the Catholic, or any other
church, to insist that its communicants and adherents have
the absolute right to send their children wherever they
please to be educated in the elementary grades, and I
challenge the statement, that there is any liberty to the
parents or to the children under the rules of the church.
As between the two, the church and the state, the state has
the paramount right."°
In the end analysis, he argued, the Oregon law "protects the rights of the
children in their right to free education." 10
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment enjoining Oregon's law, this
time without dissent. In a brief opinion, again by Justice McReynolds, the
Court noted that the Oregon law would diminish the value of the schools'
property and destroy their business,"' although the operation of private
schools was an "undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as
useful and meritorious."1  The Court concluded that the law
"unreasonably interferes with liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control," 1 3 and in its
most memorable passage declared:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
109 Transcript of Oral Argument (March 17, 1925), at 28 (emphasis in original)
(argument of George E. Chamberlain), reprinted in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS,
supra note 41, at 501. Chamberlain was former Governor of Oregon and U.S. Senator. See
Holsin er, supra note 29, at 338 n.47.
Id. at 27, reprinted in 23 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 41, at
500.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 531-33 (1925).
2 Id. at 534.
11 Id. at 534-35. Note that while the state has no right to insist that parents educate
their children in public schools (in an extreme case, there might be no demand for public
education), the Court concedes that the state can dictate the content of education. Thus, the
state can dictate the content of education but cannot dictate that such education take place in
public schools.
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power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations. 114
The Court made no reference to religious liberty, and it was apparent that
its holding applied equally to non-sectarian private schools as well as to
parochial schools.
H. RELIGION AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN MEYER AND PIERCE
Meyer and Pierce were well within the tradition of the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence. 1 5  The decisions were woven
together from bits and pieces of economic philosophy, political theory, and
common sense. What they were not, were decisions founded on
constitutional rules or standards. In Meyer, the Court hinted at the
connection between the teaching of German and the religious practices of
Midwestern Lutherans, but it refused to go so far as to recognize an
independent constitutional basis protecting the practice. It referred to
Meyer's contractual rights, but failed to state plainly that the law interfered
with Meyer's right of contract. The court adverted to the rights of parents,
but could not articulate any clear principle of law to support it.?16  By
114 Id. at 535.
115 See CURRIE, supra note 84, at 153-54; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court,
Compulsory Education, and The First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv.
213, 218-19 (1973).
116 Compare Meyer's list of rights with the Court's earlier effort in Ailgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897):
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means, not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be
free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
But see Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MicH. L. REv. 463, 572 (1983)
(arguing that Meyer "did not create a new legal right out of whole constitutional cloth. It
merely acknowledged in constitutional language the traditions of Status and the civil
(continued)
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deciding Meyer only, and reversing the remaining cases without opinion,
the Court avoided the far more difficult case presented in Bartels, in which,
so long as core courses were taught in English, parents and teachers might
agree to teach whatever subjects they wished, in any language they chose.
It is hard to see how, given the Court's endorsement of compulsory
education, the Iowa arrangement could have offended the amorphous
liberty interests of parents, students, and teachers.
The Court's opinion in Meyer surely raised more questions than it
answered. It stated as a given that compulsory formal education was within
the states' police powers, but beyond the bare assertion, what did the Court
mean? The holding was necessarily limited to English-only rules, but
might the principles extend to other education-related matters as well? If
parents can choose to have their children taught in German, can they
determine that certain subjects shall be taught in addition to the core
subjects? Can they determine that certain matters shall be taught instead of
core materials? Can they determine that certain subjects should not be
taught? (Or, as an ironic twist, might parents contract to have certain
objectionable subjects taught in German to their non-German speaking
children?) If parents have the natural duty to educate their children, who
defines the substance of the duty? If the parents define it, then the right of
the state to enforce the duty through compulsory education laws is
meaningless, since parents can easily define their duty as one of non-
education. On the other hand, if the states can define the parents' duty, in
the absence of a cogent argument based on religious freedom, what,
precisely, was wrong with Nebraska's experiment?
In many ways, Pierce was thinner gruel than Meyer. The statute was
farther reaching and, consequently, an easier target. The Court did not
have to work as hard to knit disparate rights together, but emphasized
repeatedly that the schools held property and were profitably run and that
the statute would diminish the value of the schools' property and impair or
destroy their business altogether. 1 7 All of this suggests that Pierce was an
easier case. The Court, however, had no more basis for its decision in
Pierce than it did in Meyer.
Where the Court lacked principle in Pierce, it waxed lofty. "The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose" 18 was a wonderful opening, commanding our rapt attention to
legislation that predated the Constitution.").
117 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531-33.
"' id. at 535.
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what follows, but it was only an exercise in question-begging, because the
Court had no fundamental theory of government to offer at all-certainly
nothing that might be found in the Constitution. The best the Court could
offer was the conclusion that this "fundamental theory of liberty . . .
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children .... ,119
If the Court had stopped there, it would have at least offered us a theory of
liberty. The theory, however, would not be a correct one; as the Court
itself admitted, "No question [was] raised concerning the power of the State
... to require that all children of proper age attend some school... [and]
that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught .... ,"2  Apparently the state did enjoy the power to standardize its
children to the extent of requiring schooling and prescribing certain studies.
The Court did not stop there, but found that states could not standardize
their children by forcing them to accept instruction from "public teachers
only."121 This far more narrow right was the conclusion, of course, and
certainly not a recognizable "fundamental theory of liberty" except as
judicial ipse dixit.
In context, Pierce's most memorable phrase, "[tihe child is not the
mere creature of the State," 122 has largely rhetorical, rather than analytical,
value. To say the child is not the "mere" creature of the state is not to say
that the child is not a creature of the state in some sense, as the Court well
knew. The Court pronounced the phrase as though it were an obvious
response to the question presented, that it was a given that the state's power
is not absolute, but that it may not confiscate our children. What was
confiscatory about the Oregon law once the Court admitted that the state
could compel physical attendance at school and prescribe a course of
study-especially where parents could supplement their children's secular
education with additional religious studies?
Would Meyer and Pierce have fared any better under the Free Exercise
Clause? Would we be any better off?. While the matter is not entirely free
from doubt, I think we would not be any better off. I have come to this
conclusion for three reasons, two of which are obvious and one perhaps not
so obvious.
First, the Supreme Court had long held, and had reaffirmed shortly
before Meyer, that the First Amendment did not apply to the states, either
on its own terms or based on the Fourteenth Amendment. In Permoli v.
119 Id.
20 Id. at 534.
12 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
122 id.
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First Municipality," the Court first held that "[tihe Constitution makes no
provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious
liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is there any
inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect
on the states. " lU The Court had reaffirmed this position, both prior and
subsequent to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 125  By 1923,
although the Court had consistently maintained that the First Amendment
did not apply to the states, some justices had argued that it did,126 and there
was evidence that the Court was reconsidering its position. 127
Counsel for the Society of Sisters evidently believed that its arguments
were premature, that the Court was not prepared to absorb First
Amendment rights into the Due Process Clause.12  It turned out to be a bit
of a miscalculation. The week following Pierce, the Court issued Gitlow v.
New York in which it "assume[d]" for "present purposes. .. that freedom
of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States." 129  In hindsight, the Society
of Sisters did not need the argument, but it is still puzzling that the school
did not even advance the argument in its briefs.
130
123 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
124 Id. at 609; see Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra note 34, at 1571-73 (discussing
PermolO.
" E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 597-98 (1900); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
552 (1876); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 382, 397-98 (1867) (Miller, J.,
dissenting). See also Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
39 HARv. L. REV. 429, 445-61 (1926).
126 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361-63 (1892) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 332; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
128 Counsel for the Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Arthur Mullen, commented in his
biography that he did not press a First Amendment argument because of the strength he
perceived in Permoli. Ross, Judicial Janus, supra note 16, at 172 n.262 (quoting A.F.
MULLEN, WEsTERN DEMOCRAT 222-23 (1940)). Counsel for the Society of Sisters, William
Guthrie, was a leading proponent of the substantive due process theory. Among the cases he
had briefed and argued were Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1070-75; James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE
L.J. 259, 303 n.209 (1991).
129 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
130 The Court subsequently characterized the Oregon statute in Pierce as "directed at
(continued)
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If Permoli was the obstacle to raising the Free Exercise Clause in a
state case, what if Meyer or Pierce had arisen in a U.S. territory? 131 In
fact, the depth of the Court's feeling for the parental right recognized in
Meyer and Pierce, and its resistance to religious claims, was demonstrated
just two years after Pierce in a case involving Hawaii's refulation of
private foreign language schools. In Farrington v. Tokushige, Hawaii,
in order to promote "'the Americanism of the pupils, ""3 had subjected its
163 foreign language schools, teaching Japanese, Korean and Chinese, to
strict regulation of the schools, teachers, and textbooks. Furthermore,
Hawaii prohibited younger children from attending foreign language
schools at all until they had completed fourth grade. The foreign language
schools were largely supplemental to public schools and were "'Buddhist
schools' conducted on church property by church leaders.
" 134
The Court, again through Justice McReynolds, unanimously affirmed
the injunction against Hawaii's law. The Fifth Amendment, the Court said,
protected the same "fundamental rights of the individual" as were protected
against state infringement by the Fourteenth. Citing Meyer, Bartels, and
Pierce, the Court concluded that Hawaii's law "deprive[d] parents of fair
opportunity to procure for their children instruction which they think is
important and [which] we cannot say is harmful."135 Given the opportunity
to decide the case on the basis of the First Amendment, the Court again
blinked.
This brings me to the second point. Even if the Court had thought the
First Amendment applied to the states, there was still the problem of
substantive Free Exercise doctrine. The few Free Exercise Clause cases
decided by the Supreme Court-beginning with Reynolds v. United
States 136-were remarkably hostile to religion. 137 Application of Reynolds'
particular religions" and the foreign language statutes in Meyer and Bartels as directed at
"nationals." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
131 The Court had already made clear that the First Amendment applied in the
territories. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding, against First Amendment
challenge, an Idaho territorial law denying right to vote to Mormons).
273 U.S. 284 (1927).
'3 Id. at 293.
13 PFEFER, supra note 34, at 515 (footnote omitted).
13S 273 U.S. at 298.
136 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
137 E.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Late Corporation of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). An excellent
discussion of the arguments and decisions in these cases may be found in Randall D. Guynn
& Gene C. Schaerr, The Mormon Polygamy Cases, SUNSTONE, Sept. 1987, at 8-17.
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belief/action distinction to the claims in Pierce would undoubtedly have
worked in favor of Oregon. The Court had not always treated church or
religious claims with such hostility. In one case in which the Court treated
religion favorably, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 13 the
Church argued that a law prohibiting the prepayment of transportation or
other encouragement of emigration to the United States under a contract of
employment did not apply to the Church hiring an Episcopal pastor from
England. The Court held that even though the act of the Church was
"within the letter of [the statute]" it was "not within the intention of the
legislature. The Court refused to impute to Congress "action against
religion ... because this is a religious people ... a Christian nation. " "
Despite the Court's glowing description of the religious heritage of the
United States, Holy Trinity provided a good excuse for the Court to uphold
the freedom to contract.
That brings me to my final point. From the Court's perspective in
1923-25, Free Exercise claims were substantive due process claims.. For
the Court, recognition of a free exercise right in the Due Process Clause
would have been no less a substantive due process decision than its
recognition of a parental right to direct children's education. Until the
1940s, so-called First Amendment rights, as applied against the states, were
explicitly non-textual rights; they derived from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment alone./4' Note carefully what the Court said
the week after Pierce in Gitlow: "freedom of speech and of the press-
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States."' 42 The Court referred to the First Amendment
by analogy; it was very careful not to say that the First Amendment itself
applied to the states. Nor did the Court even imply that the "freedom of
speech and of the press" protected as a "liberty" under the Due Process
Clause was the same freedom of speech and press protected by the First
Amendment.
In fact, the Court was quite careful in subsequent cases to distinguish
between the freedom of speech and press binding on the states and the
prohibitions of the First Amendment on the federal government. In Palko
138 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
139 Id. at 472.140 Id. at 465, 47 1.
'41 See Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra note 35, at 1602-04.
142 268 U.S. at 666.
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v. Connecticut, the Court expressly refused to bind itself to the proposition
that "[wihatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights ... if
done by the federal government is now equally unlawful by force of the
Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state. This absorption of First
Amendment-type rights rather than incorporation of the First Amendment
itself meant that the Court would not impose the First Amendment in name
against the states, and if not in name, then not in text either, and if the text
didn't apply, then the history of the First Amendment did not apply as well.
It meant that the First Amendment as applied to the federal government, as
positive law, could be quite different from the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of religious liberty, speech, press, and petition, as natural law.
For many years, members of the Court repeatedly took the position that the
free speech and press standard applied to the states was not the same as that
imposed by the First Amendment.'"
The Court's attempt to maintain dual standards was inherently unstable,
however. The Court had nothing to anchor itself when deciding state cases
except the First Amendment. When it decided federal cases, the Court
(even if it did not do so) knew that it had recourse to the text of the First
Amendment, its legislative history, and its broader history.145 Justice
Jackson, in his opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, recognized the instability in the Court's approach:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of
the First, is much more definite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due
process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of
143 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
14 E.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 456 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 169-70 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting); Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 706 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-91 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting). See also Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The general
principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth
Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used,
although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is
allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of
the United States.").
145 E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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the First become its standard. 146
What the Court ultimately figured out was.that without text or history, it
had no mooring for the right it thought comprehended in the Due Process
Clause. In the end, the Court could no longer pretend that the standards
were different in its own mind. Justice Black ended the charade once and
for all in 1947 with the simple declaration that "The First Amendment, as
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, commands that a state
Ishall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.' 
1 47
Incorporation of the First Amendment was not simply a case of the
Court finding it convenient for the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to mean, in an appropriate case, the same as the Free
Exercise, Speech, and Press Clauses of the First. That it was convenient
was true enough; but, more importantly, the converse was equally true:
For the Court, it was quite convenient that the First Amendment should
mean the same as the Due Process Clause. The reasons for this are
complex, as I have explained elsewhere, 148 but they are owed to the fact
that the First Amendment has been used by the Court for purposes that far
outstrip its text, intent, and history. As Professor Steven Smith has so
carefully pointed out, the First Amendment was "calculated merely to
assign jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states. ,149 The First
Amendment was a federalism provision (and, I would add, had an
important separation of powers component as well) to guarantee federal
non-interference to religions and religionists and leave to the states the
privilege of deciding whether to regulate or not regulate religions and
'~ 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
147 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (citations omitted). Everson,
which involved the Establishment Clause, completed the process of "absorption" or
"incorporation" of the various guarantees of the First Amendment. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) (Right of Petition Clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Free Press
Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Free Speech Clause).
148 Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra note 35.
149 STEvEN D. SMrrH, FoREoRDAINED FALUPRE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 26 (1995). As Professor Smith points out, we have
compensated for the lack of principle of religious freedom in the First Amendment or its
legislative history through a "two-step interpretive process" in which we "identify evidence
of what one or more of the framers or their contemporaries said or thought, not necessarily
about the religion clauses per se, but about the subject of religious freedom," and we then
"superimpose this opinion or view about religious freedom onto the religion clauses." Id. at
46 (emphasis in original).
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religionists. The First Amendment has been put to tasks for which it is
singularly ill-suited. The Court's religion-speech-press due process
jurisprudence in the 30-year-period following Gitlow came largely from
state cases. Is° These are substantive due process cases, which the Court
then willingly folded into the First Amendment with the merger of Due
Process Clause and First Amendment jurisprudence.
All of this is a long way of saying that, in Meyer, when the Court
considered the choice between deciding whether Nebraska's Siman Act
interfered with either the Lutherans' religious exercise or the parents'
control of their children's education, it was faced with a choice between
two substantive due process rights. The Court had no more textual basis
for deciding the religion claims than it did for deciding the parental claims.
I suspect that, because there was some history on the First Amendment in
Permoli and a holding the Court would like to have ignored in Reynolds,
the parental rights rationale afforded the Court a public path of least
resistance.
III. WISCONSIN V. YODER AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION
What, it is fair to ask, does all of this have to do with Yoder?
Wisconsin v. Yoder follows quite logically from the Court's substantive due
process decisions in Meyer and Pierce. While Yoder is couched mostly in
First Amendment terms, it has more in common with the substantive due
process decisions than with the First Amendment.
A. The Amish and the Wisconsin Compulsory Education Law
The Wisconsin compulsory education law is unremarkable. Similar to
the laws of most states, Wisconsin provided that children seven to sixteen
years old must "attend school regularly." I assume (though I have not
inquired further) that Wisconsin made some provision for the curriculum of
public, private, and home schools. Curriculum was not at issue; for the
Amish the question was not "what kind of schooling?" but "schooling or
not?"
150 E.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 U.S. (1937); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293
U.S. 245 (1934); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
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The Old World Amish were relatively new to New Glarus, Wisconsin.
The Amish had been in the United States since they emigrated from
Switzerland and Germany in the early 1700s, and they had only begun
arriving in New Glarus from Ohio, Iowa, and Illinois in 1964.151 The New
Glarus Amish were largely German-speaking, as were nearly one-quarter
of the non-Amish inhabitants of the town, who also preferred the language
of their Swiss ancestors to English."' .Within four years of their arrival,
the Amish withdrew their children from the New Glarus public schools,
objecting to the teaching of evolution and such practices as requiring shorts
in physical education classes.1 3  The withdrawal must have caused
resentment beyond the issue of nonconformity. "The drop in enrollment
cost the New Glarus public school $18,000 in state aid, which had to be
made up by increased local taxes.
" 154
In Yoder, the claim of religious freedom arrived front and center, a
witness to the U.S. Supreme Court's embrace of jot-for-jot incorporation.
The trial and appellate courts fully addressed the question of religious
liberty, and both lower courts ruled in favor of the state.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding in favor of the
Amish. The question for the Wisconsin court was whether "the burden on
the free exercise of one's religion" outweighed "the importance of the
state's interest."1 5 As to the burden on the Amish, the Court concluded
that "[t]o the Amish, secondary schools not only teach an unacceptable
value system but they also seek to integrate ethnic groups into a
homogenized society, resulting in a psychological alienation of Amish
children from their parents and great harm to the child. 1 56  The burden
imposed by the state was "a heavy one. 
5 7
... Donald Janson, Wisconsin Town, Geared to Tourism, Divides Over Amish Values,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1971, at 20. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adverted to the fact that
some of the Amish left Iowa for Wisconsin because of the enforcement of Iowa's compulsory
education law. State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 542 (1971), a'd, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
152 Janson, supra note 151, at 20.
153 The Unworldly Amish Greet Victory Quietly, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1972, at 20;
see also Thomas J. Meyers, Education and Schooling, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE 87-106
(Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993).
154 Janson, supra note 151, at 20. There was apparently some evidence in the record
that the Amish were punished for violating Wisconsin's compulsory education law in hopes
of forcing the Amish back into public schools and regaining lost state aid. State v. Yoder,
182 N.W.2d at 550 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
'5 Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 540.
156 Id. at 542.
157 Id.
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The court then turned to the state's interest. For the state, the court's
opening did not bode well. The Wisconsin Supreme Court began with the
declaration that "compulsory education . . . is not a compelling interest
although it is within the state power to regulate." 5' Operating from that
premise, the court had little difficulty concluding that exempting the Amish
would put the state "to no expense" and would "do no more to the ultimate
goal of education than to dent the symmetry of the design of
enforcement." 159 Five justices concurred to limit the holding to "children
of members of the Old Order Amish religion or Conservative Amish
Mennonite Church, living as members of the Amish community."'
Justice Heffernan dissented. He noted that the Amish were not
prosecuted for failing to send their children to public school, but for failing
to send their children to some school. 16  This distinction, he argued, was
critical because it "conceives the problem as one of religious liberty."
162
He noted that elsewhere the Amish had established elementary and
vocational schools as an alternative to public education. The majority had
posed a false dichotomy since "[n]o part of [the Wisconsin] law requires a
student to go to a school not of his own religious choice. It merely reuires
that he go to a school. 1 63  Citing the Northwest Ordinance' and
statements in Brown v. Board of Education1 6 to demonstrate the
importance of education to the states, he particularly faulted the state for
failing "to deal realistically or imaginatively with a difficult problem."
166
Given the Wisconsin Supreme Court's premises, it was not difficult to
understand the result. By setting up the measure of the Free Exercise
Clause as a simple balancing test and then starting from the premise that the
state had no real interest in compulsory education, almost any burden on
the Amish would have been sufficient to outweigh the state's insubstantial
interest. I say that the court set up the balancing test as the measure of the
Free Exercise Clause, but I do not say that with a lot of confidence. The
court mentioned the Free Exercise Clause by name, but nowhere in any of
1SS Id.
159 Id. at 545.
160 Id. at 547 (C. Hansen, J., concurring).
161 See id. at 547 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 551.
164 See 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) ("Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.").
16 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
1 Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 550.
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the opinions did anyone find it necessary to cite it, much less construe it.
167
And nowhere did the court even mention the Wisconsin Declaration of
Rights. 168  The First and Fourteenth Amendments were quoted in a
footnote attached to an introductory syllabus, just before listing the counsel
in the case.
169
B. Wisconsin v. Yoder
I find it surprising that the Court granted review in Yoder. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court gave no deference to the Wisconsin compulsory
education law. It made no effort to construe the First Amendment. It gave
only the most meager attention to the U.S. Supreme Court's prior cases.
There was very little to review. The Supreme Court surely did not
question the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the importance-
or lack thereof-of compulsory education to the state. Moreover, since the
state court had exempted the Amish (striking down the compulsory
attendance statute as applied to the Amish), there were no grounds for
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, only discretionary review by
writ of certiorari.17° The Court nevertheless granted review.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority in Yoder is a model of
imprecision. More sophisticated than the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
opinion, the Court worked at a very high level of abstraction. The First
Amendment itself played no significant role in the decision but was again
relegated to a footnote.171  The real inquiry for the Court was the
"balancing process" between the "state's interest in universal education" on
the one hand and the interest protected by the Free Exercise Clause and
"the traditional interest of parents with the respect to the religious
167 The court attributed the need to balance interests to just two cases, NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
168 Wisc. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. I, § 18 provides:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person
be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or
interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any
preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit
of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
169 See Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 540 n.2.
170 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 note (quoting prior statute; the statute now provides only for
certiorari review).
171 See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1972).
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upbringing of their children so long as they 'prepare [them] for
additional obligations" 172 on the other.
The Court's view of the Free Exercise Clause was further muddled by
the Court's awkward attempt to reconcile Reynolds with its more recent
pronouncements. The Court seemed to pay homage to Reynolds: "the
Religion Clauses had specifically and finally fixed the right to free exercise
of religious beliefs." At the same time, the Court eviscerated Reynolds'
distinction between belief and action:
to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be
subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny
that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment .... This case
. . .does not become easier because respondents were
convicted for their "actions" in refusing to send their
children to the public high school; in this context belief and
action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments.
17 4
All of this, the Court said, preserved "doctrinal flexibility."
175
In the end, the Court concluded that the additional two years of
schooling that would be required of Amish children would interfere with
their "religious development ... and. . . integration into the way of life of
the Amish faith community." 176 Those same two years of schooling for the
Amish were of less concern to the state. The Amish children were well
prepared for their life within their insular community. Finally, noting the
relationship between the compulsory education laws and child labor laws,
the Court observed that there was
no intimation that the Amish employment of their children
on family farms is in any way deleterious to their health or
that Amish parents exploit children at tender years. Any
such inference would be contrary to the record before us.
Moreover, employment of Amish children on the family
farm does not present the undesirable economic aspects of
172 Id. at 214 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). Note the Court's reference to
"religious upbringing," the argument made to, but ignored by, the Court in Meyer and
Pierce.
173 Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
174 Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 221.
176 Id. at 218.
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eliminating jobs that might otherwise be held by adults. 1"
Justice White concurred in the Court's "delicate balancing of important
but conflicting interests., 178 He wrote to emphasize the importance of the
state's interest. This case was different from Pierce, which held that a state
may not preempt private education. Here, the question was not
"maintenance of a educational system as an end in itself," but the broader
concerns of "attempting to nurture and develop the human potential of its
children."'17 9 In this case, Justice White could not conclude "that Amish
children who leave school in the eighth grade will be intellectually stultified
or unable to acquire new academic skills later."'
8g
IV. YODER, RELIGION AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
How should we regard Yoder? Is it about parents' right to direct their
children's education, religious liberty, or something else? Let me begin
with brief observations on the categorization of Yoder. The exercise of
categorizing Yoder is useful to help us understand what Yoder means.
First, Yoder could be a pure parental rights case, although I think it
difficult to maintain that position. There are some significant differences
between Meyer and Pierce and Yoder. No one in Meyer or Pierce sought
exemption from the state's power to mandate schooling, nor did the parties
challenge the state's power to prescribe a basic curriculum. In neither
Meyer nor Pierce were the children receiving any less education than that
prescribed by the state. 18 The question in Meyer was whether private'
schools could provide something more in their curriculum; in Pierce, the
question was where was the basic education to take place. Thus, if Yoder
stood for the proposition that parents can direct their children's education to
the extent of opting out of the state's requirements, it would represent a
substantial step for parental control. Even if Yoder could be read more
narrowly to embrace a parental right to provide an equivalent or alternative
education, it would be a significant extension of Meyer and Pierce.
Recently two courts of appeals have held that claims based on parental
rights to direct the education of children, considered independent of
,7 See id. at 229.
178 Id. at 237 (White, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
"s Id. at 240. Justice Stewart filed a brief concurring opinion. See id. at 237. Justice
Douglas filed an opinion dissenting in part in which he argued that the real rights at issue
were the rights of the children. See id. at 241.
1s1 See id. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
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religious free exercise concerns, are subject to rational basis scrutiny. 182
This surely diminishes the strength of Meyer and Pierce. If those courts
are correct about the standard of review, then it is hard to see Yoder as a
pure parental rights case. The best evidence that Yoder is not purely a
parental rights case comes from Yoder itself, whose first reference to
Pierce was to reassure us that "[t]here [was] no doubt as to the power of a
State . . to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education."
8 3
Yoder does not so follow from Meyer and Pierce that the impact of the
Wisconsin laws on the Amish's religious observance (as opposed to their
parental rights) is irrelevant. Even calling Yoder a "hybrid"-a
combination of parental rights and Free Exercise claim-does not
illuminate much. Meyer and Pierce were also hybrid claims and, indeed,
each presented a more compelling case that the laws were religious
gerrymanders, 184 designed to force the assimilation of the German-
.. 185Lutheran and Catholic communities.
Second, while Yoder is typically thought of as a free exercise case, 186 it
surely is not a strong defense of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court paid
homage to the Free Exercise Clause, but the Court had no theory, no
standard for judging free exercise cases. The Court said that Wisconsin put
the Amish to the choice of either abandoning their belief that worldly
learning would bring about their assimilation or migrating elsewhere and
that this was "precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of
religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent." 187 The phrase
bears the same kind of air of profundity as Pierce's "fundamental theory
192 See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177-79 (4th
Cir. 1996); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1996). See
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-47 & n.7 (1968) (discussing the constitutionality of
states' power to enforce compulsory attendance statutes); also Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.
Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (rejecting a challenge to home schooling regulations where no
religious interest was alleged).
1'3 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
18 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
1L. Those cases could be recategorized as religious free exercise cases, see Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18
(1947), or even as something far broader. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 n.15
(1976) ("The Meyer-Pierce-Yoder 'parental' right and the privacy right... may be no more
than verbal variations of a single constitutional right.").
'6 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 566-67 & n.4 (Souter, J., concurring)
(arguin that Yoder is not a hybrid claim, but a pure free exercise claim).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
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S.. upon which all governments ... repose."188  But merely describing
the apparent choices to the Amish is not a standard against which the free
exercise of religion had been previously measured. 1 9 Nor is it a standard
against which future free exercise cases could be measured, because the
same choices could be said to threaten nearly any religious practice. Laws
prohibiting a religious practice or compelling an irreligious practice will
always have a tendency to encourage assimilation, and migration will
always be an alternative to assimilation. The same could have been said of
the choices put to the Mormons by the banning of polygamy, depriving the
Mormons of the franchise and forcing escheatment of the church's
property; 190 the Jehovah's Witnesses by compelling them to salute the flag
or prohibiting their witnessing in public; 191 and Orthodox Jews, who were
forbidden by their religious beliefs from working on the Jewish Sabbath
and prohibited by state law from working on the predominant Christian
Sabbath.
192
The Court told us, without admitting as much expressly, that Reynolds'
belief/action distinction was not the standard for the Free Exercise
Clause.193  The Court had no reason to abandon Reynolds entirely,
however, since it would not even speculate as to whether it was Amish
beliefs or conduct that the state was regulating. The Court would do no
more than to say that "in this context belief and action cannot be neatly
confined in logic-tight compartments." 194 The Court was just not very
helpful.
Moreover, if Yoder were a Free Exercise case, then we would expect
that children could also come forward to seek exemption from compulsory
education, even where their religious choices were contrary to those of
18s Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
19 The Court's repeated emphasis on the marginal value to the state of two additional
years of schooling is double-edged, since the state was only requiring of the Amish "an
additional one or two years of formal school education." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225. See also
Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause,
1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 338 ("Surely there was no danger that the entire religious faith and
practice of these convicted parents would be totally destroyed if their children attended two
years of high school.").
190 E.g., Late Corporation of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879).
191 E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
92 E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
93 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.194 Id. at 2W0.
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their parents. I am not confident that even Justice Douglas would go so
far. He was concerned that "if an Amish child desires to attend high
school, and is mature enough to have that desire respected, the State may
well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated objections. 19
Justice Douglas was at least willing to honor a child's wishes so long as the
result was more education. I doubt the Court would be willing to recognize
a child's free exercise right where the result was less formal education.
This emphasizes that Yoder really is about parental rights. Of course, I
just discussed above why Yoder was not a pure parental rights case. Yoder
must, therefore, be about a particular kind of parental right and a particular
form of religious free exercise. Perhaps what Yoder is really about is the
right of parents to direct their children's religious education. That would
place Yoder within the Meyer-Pierce tradition without tasking Yoder with
broader implications for the Free Exercise Clause. (It would also mean
that Justice Scalia was probably right about Yoder.)
Third, maybe Yoder is really a child labor case. Perhaps Yoder is a
fulfillment of Justice McReynolds' concerns that compulsory education
laws would curtail the Court's child labor decisions. 197 By crafting Meyer
and Pierce as matters of parental control, McReynolds laid a foundation for
the Court to resist child labor laws as an infringement of parental control of
their children. Yoder gives utterance to McReynolds' designs. The Court
noted the historical relationship between compulsory education laws and
child labor laws and observed that child labor laws prevented employment
of children in hazardous work or in jobs that adults could perform. 98 The
Court discounted Wisconsin's interest in preventing child labor because
Amish children were agricultural laborers working mainly on family farms.
This work, the Court said, was not "deleterious to their health," nor did it
eliminate jobs that might be held by adults. 199 The Court gave no weight to
the state's interest in child agricultural employment, and its inability to find
any connection whatsoever between child labor and the elimination of adult
labor was a finding unworthy of a Court that could conjure up Wickard v.
Filbum.200
'9 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
196 See Professor Gilles' thoughtful discussion. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating
Children: A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 992-1000, 1009-12 (1996).
197 E.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
198 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228.
'99 Id. at 229.
200 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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These observations help me understand why the promise of Yoder has
been long on rhetoric and short on substance. 2° ' In the area of its greatest
promise, free exercise claims, Yoder has had limited impact, a fulfillment
of the Court's own prediction that "probably few other religious groups or
sects" could make the Amish's "convincing showing."= Yoder's
precedential value depends not on parties being able to make claims
analogous to those made by the Amish, but to making themselves analogous
to the Amish. John Singer sought less than the Amish: he wasn't asking
for exemption from compulsory education laws, but from the reporting
requirements for his home schooling. Unfortunately, Singer was a less
sympathetic figure, a solitary, more truculent version of the Amish. And
John Singer is not alone. Take, for example, the case of Peter Duro.
Duro and his wife were Pentecostal Christians living in North Carolina.
Duro refused to send his children to North Carolina public schools or to the
local Christian schools because he objected that the schools promoted the
unisex movement and secular humanism. Mrs. Duro undertook their six
children's education at home with one of the approved Christian curricula.
The district court found, on the basis of Yoder, that the North Carolina
compulsory education law was unconstitutional as applied to the Duros.
The Fourth Circuit, admitting that the Duros held sincere religious beliefs,
reversed. The district court misapplied Yoder, it said, "because it arose in
an entirely different factual context."20 3  Here is the court of appeals'
explanation of the difference:
The Duros, unlike their Amish counterparts, are not
members of a community which has existed for three
centuries and has a long history of being a successful, self-
sufficient, segment of American society. Furthermore, in
Yoder, the Amish children attended public school through
the eighth grade and then obtained informal vocational
training to enable them to assimilate into the self-contained
Amish community. However, in the present case, Duro
refuses to enroll his children in any public or nonpublic
school for any length of time, but still expects them to be
fully integrated and live normally in the modem world
20' See Kurland, supra note 115, at 231 ("Wisconsin v. Yader is, without doubt, an
innovative opinion; whether it will also prove to be a seminal one remains to be seen.").
202 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235-36.
203 Duro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District, 712 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
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upon reaching the age of 18.2o4
The Fourth Circuit's reading of Yoder seems to limit the case to religious
communities and even then to only those well-established communities that
hope to keep their children isolated. There was no recognition by the court
that if parents may direct their children's education (religious or otherwise),
they may do so irrespective of whether others concur in their religious
views and educational goals. "Men may believe what they cannot
prove, ,25 but if they can't persuade someone to join them, they may be out
of luck when it comes to the Free Exercise Clause.
On the other hand, Iowa is apparently not as demanding as North
Carolina with respect to religious pedigree. A statutory "Amish exception"
from school standards may be obtained by those who "profess principles or
tenets that differ substantially from the [state's] objectives, goals, and
philosophy of education." 206 The exemption is available, regrettably, only
to members of "a recognized church or religious denomination established
for ten years or more within the state of Iowa. "207  In West Virginia,
children are ineligible for home schooling if their standardized test scores
are below the 40th percentile and do not improve with home schooling.
One federal district court approved the statute based on the
"'reasonableness' standard" because the "statute's 40 percent cutoff
reasonably may be intended to promote above average scores., 2 8  In
Justice White's words, the statute sought to prevent children from being
"intellectually stultified. '"209  This kind of thinking gives new and dark
meaning to the phrase "religious fringe."
Even religious communities that have sought more modest exemptions
from compulsory educational requirements have not been particularly
successful. Perhaps the most watched sequel to Yoder was the Mozert
litigation in Eastern Tennessee. 210 The plaintiffs were fundamentalist
204 Id.
205 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
206 Id.
207 13 IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.24 (1996).
208 Null v. Board of Educ., 815 F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D. W. Va. 1993).
209 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
210 Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 579 F. Supp. 1051; 582 F. Supp. 201
(E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985), on remand, 647 F. Supp. 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988). The litigation is carefully reviewed in Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew A Circle
That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education,
106 HARV. L. REv. 581 (1993).
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Christians who objected to the Holt, Rinehart and Winston reader being
used in the county public schools. It was clear under Tennessee law (and
following Meyer and Pierce) that the parents had the right to withdraw their
children and place them in a private school or educate them at home, but
instead they requested that their children be excused only from the
assignments involving the Holt reader. It was a sensible request, and the
parents cited Yoder in support of their claim. The Sixth Circuit would have
none of it: "Yoder rested on such a singular set of facts that we do not
believe it can be held to announce a general rule that exposure without
compulsion to act, believe, affirm or deny creates an unconstitutional
burden. ""' The court distinguished Mozert from Yoder because "[u]nlike
the plaintiffs in the present case, the parents in Yoder did not want their
children to attend any high school or be exposed to any part of a high
school curriculum" 2",a strange response to parents who were otherwise
213willing to accept the state's version of education. There are other
examples.
214
This is not to say that Yoder has not been helpful to some parties. One
of the most interesting post-Yoder cases was Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.
211 Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067.
212 Id.
213 See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious, Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 863, 889-98 (1988).
214 E.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying
challenge to home schooling regulations:
mhe holding in Yoder must be limited to its unique facts and does not
control the outcome of plaintiffs' free exercise challenge in this case.
Unless a child is a member of an identifiable religious sect with a long
history of maintaining a successful community separate and apart from
American society in general, it must be assumed that that child must be
intellectually, socially, and psychologically prepared to interact with
others who may not share the views of the parents in the case at bar.
Id. Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74, 84 (Iowa
1985) (refusing an "Amish exception" to parents of children in fundamental Baptist school;
"Their educational needs are plainly not as circumscribed as those of Amish children.
Whatever they may feel about their children's religious needs, the plaintiffs have not
established that their children's educational needs are significantly different from those of
other children."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985). See also Murphy v. State, 852 F.2d
1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting challenge to home schooling requirements; annual testing
required imposed only on home-schooled children; if child failed to achieve appropriate
score, child must be placed in public or private school); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist
Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981) (upholding injunction against Christian
school that refused to permit any state monitoring).
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v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission.215  Dayton Christian Schools was an
interdenominational school. Faculty and administration annually
reaffirmed their allegiance to the school's Statement of Faith, including
acceptance of the Bible as "the inspired and the only infallible authoritative
Word of God." 21 6 When a teacher at the school informed the principal that
she was pregnant, he advised her by letter that the school believed that
mothers should remain at home with their pre-school children and that her
contract would not be renewed. After her attorney contacted the school
about the policy and threatened legal action, the school withdrew the letter
(because the policy had not been published to faculty)-and then fired her
for contacting the attorney. The teacher had violated the Biblical Chain of
Command, which was express in her contract and which she testified she
understood meant not taking another Christian to law."' The teacher then
filed a complaint with Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which found it
probable that Dayton Christian Schools had engaged in sex discrimination
in violation of the Ohio Civil Rights Act. The school sought an injunction
against Ohio's attempt to enforce the Act. The district court denied the
injunction, but the Sixth Circuit, in a substantial opinion, reversed. Yoder
was prominent:
The claims of the Amish parents in Yoder are similar in
kind to those of appellants in that the Amish parents
objected to the values to which their children would be
exposed in public high school, in the same way that
appellants object to the state's attempt to regulate DCS
hiring practices with the result of coercing the school into
retaining or hiring teachers whose lifestyles and actions
conflict with the parents' basic religious beliefs.2"'
Interestingly, the Supreme Court granted Ohio's appeal, heard oral
arguments on the religion question, and then reversed on the grounds of the
abstention doctrine. 2 19 Dayton Christian Schools would have pushed Yoder
215 578 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd
on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
216 Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 766 F.2d at 936-37 n.8; 578 F. Supp. at 1009 n.2.
217 Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 578 F. Supp. at 1012-13. The Biblical Chain of
Command was based upon Matthew 18: 15-17 and Ga/atians 6:1.
219 Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 766 F.2d at 948.
'19 477 U.S. 619 (1986). Dayton Christian Schools was represented before the
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit by William Bentley Ball, who had also represented the
Amish in Yoder.
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beyond the education context of Meyer and Pierce.220 There are other
examples that seem to build on the Amish' success. 221
CONCLUSION
Yoder, like Meyer and Pierce, has been cobbled together from bits of
family law, the Free Exercise Clause, and the liberty of contract. Its
origins are clearly in Lochner. Meyer and Pierce have endured beyond the
contract cases because we like the results. Even their terminology is that of
Lochner: In Meyer, the Court concluded that knowledge of German was
not "harmful" or "injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the
ordinary child.,222 In Pierce, the Court found that the operation of private
schools was "not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and
meritorious."2 In Yoder, the Court thought that employment of Amish
children in place of formal schooling not "deleterious to their health., 224 In
Lochner, the Court opined that baking, "in and of itself, is not an unhealthy
[trade] to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with
the right to labor, and with the right of free contract." 225 The future of
Yoder, Meyer, and Pierce will be as capricious as the Court that created
them. Just as a child is "not the mere creature of the State," 226 so too New
York's bakers were "in no sense wards of the State." 227 I cannot argue
with either proposition, but I also cannot support either by reference to the
Constitution.
In the end analysis, Yoder yields little law. Yoder is a good opinion in
the sense that we still admire the Amish and respect their choices. Yoder,
however, is a failure as an explanation of why the Constitution compels us
to respect their choices. In his dissent in Lochner, Justice Holmes
complained that "[e]very opinion tends to become a law. I congratulate
220 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward A Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious
Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99.
21 E.g., Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989)
(reversing summary judgment against plaintiffs-members of the "Plymouth Brethren," a
devout Irish Christian group founded in the 18OOs-who sought to have their children
exempted from AIDS instruction); State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976) (striking
Ohio statute regulating private religious schools).
m Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400, 403.
223 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
-4 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229.
2Z Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905).
226 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
227 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
228 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the Amish, but look forward to the day when law can find its way back into
every opinion.
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